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I. INTRODUCTION
People like simple. People like straightforward. People like easy. But life
is not simple, life is not straightforward, life is not easy. And like life, neither
is the law. Figuring out the more difficult answers, often requires more
difficult work.
One of the biggest criticisms of the law is that it is overly complex; it
should be simplified. Bright-line rules and tests help simplify the law. If a
certain action falls into a category, the proceedings move forward; if it does
not, then they do not. This provides notice and allows for judicial efficiency.
Simple.
However, bright-line rules are not always ideal. What is simplest may not
always be what is best. The law is complicated. There are grey areas. Each
situation raised by the law has different facts that may not neatly fall onto one
side of a bright-line. What happens if the law creates a rule that is too narrow,
allowing certain actions that should be punished to skate by, or so broad it
captures actions society does not wish to punish?
The Sixth Circuit recently tried to simplify a complicated doctrine in
trademark law: likelihood to cause confusion. They did so by creating a
bright-line gateway. The new rule stated that if a trademark dispute fell into a
certain category the alleged offender would not be liable. However, in doing
so, the court created a legal loophole. The loophole provides a way for actual
customer confusion to exist but also allows courts not to find any likelihood
to cause confusion, undermining the overall purpose of the law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF A TRADEMARK

Trademarks exist to prevent unfair competition and protect property
rights.1 A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof”2 used by a person in commerce “to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown.”3 Trademarks serve several functions. They
identify the goods sold by one manufacturer from goods sold by another,
signify that all the goods bearing a certain mark come from a single source,
1 See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
COMPETITION § 1.03 (1996).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
3 Id.
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inform consumers that similar goods with the mark are of equal quality, and
help advertise companies and their products.4 All of these functions are
essential in today’s competitive economic world.5
Imagine a world with no trademarks. A world with no Nike swoosh, no
McDonald’s golden arches, no Apple logo, or any image commonly associated
with a specific company. There would be no way to distinguish products of
high quality of a certain brand from cheaper knock-offs. So why would
companies sell anything but the cheaper indistinguishable products?6 The
driving factor behind trademarked symbols is that consumers relate the marks
with a certain level of quality affiliated with products from the proprietor of
the mark.7 That assurance of quality associated with the mark provides the
company with customer loyalty and value.8 However, this also provides
incentives for other companies to attempt to use another’s trademark and
benefit from their goodwill established by another.9 If one company believes
another is infringing on its trademark, or interfering with the exclusive right to
use its mark,10 it can file suit in federal court seeking an injunction to stop the
use and potentially monetary damages.11
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF TRADEMARK LEGISLATION AND THE LANHAM ACT

Congress is granted the power to regulate trademarks through the
Commerce Clause.12 This Clause grants Congress the power to “regulate
[c]ommerce with foreign [n]ations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian Tribes.”13 Congress first attempted to federally regulate trademarks in
However, the Supreme Court struck that law down as
1870.14
unconstitutional.15 Congress passed the first successful modern federal
trademark registration statute in 1905.16 Despite initial success, that act
ultimately proved problematic in the long-term and eventually needed to be
replaced.17 As a result, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Act of 1946:

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3.01[2].
Id.
Id. § 3.02[2].
Id. § 3.04[1].
Id. § 3.01[2].
Id. § 2.01[2][a].
Infringement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30.01, 30.24, 32.01.
Id. § 5.03.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.03.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Lanham Act.18 Though amended several times since its inception, the
Lanham Act is the primary legislation governing federal trademark
infringements.
Congress codified much of the existing trademark common law when it
enacted the Lanham Act.19 The Act continues to establish federal standards
for trademarks, service marks, and unfair competition.20 It provides a
standard for establishing what a trademark is and procedures for federally
registering trademarks.21 Additionally, it lays out very specifically when
trademark owners might be entitled to federal trademark infringement claims
and what remedies may be available if a trademark is violated.22
C. LIKELIHOOD TO CAUSE CONFUSION

The Lanham Act set forth the standard in federal trademark disputes:
unauthorized use of a registered mark in commerce that is likely to cause
confusion.23 That standard applies in all cases except for causes of action
relating to dilution of famous marks.24 The “likelihood to cause confusion”
standard is incredibly complex. Debates over some of the issues surrounding
it could fill articles and chapters substantially longer than this one. Therefore,
this section will only serve to provide a brief overview of the standard and the
importance of its interpretation.
On its face, likelihood to cause confusion seems relatively simple.
However, the difficulties it presents become readily apparent once the
standard is applied in practice. For instance, does an image or symbol
appearing on a product look similar enough to a trademarked symbol to cause
consumer confusion over who produced the goods? How similar do symbols
need to be in order to be likely to cause confusion? How many consumers
must be confused by the symbols used to justify a trademark infringement?25
Should it be enough if one consumer is confused, and if not, how many need
to be until we reach the requisite threshold? Furthermore, the Lanham Act
only requires a likelihood to cause confusion, so does someone whose
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
The Lanham Act, US LEGAL, http://trademarks.uslegal.com/trademark-law/the-lanhamact/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2017).
20 Lanham (Trademark) Act, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/content/lan
ham-act.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012).
24 JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INDEX: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE &
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 10.01, n.6 (2017).
25 See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23.01[2].
18
19
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trademark is allegedly being infringed upon need to show actual confusion by
consumers or just the potential for confusion?26
While many of these questions continue to cause problems for the legal
system, two of the biggest concerns are whether consumers actually need to be
confused by a mark27 and how similar a mark must be to be considered an
infringement.28 Courts largely address these questions on a case-by-case basis,
and the outcome depends on the type of trademark in question.29 This section
will address and provide some examples of how courts have attempted to
resolve these problems.
Courts have held that plaintiffs do not need to show actual confusion to
establish likelihood of confusion, though evidence of actual confusion can be
persuasive evidence.30 Surveys and witness testimony are frequently used to
prove actual confusion in court.31 However, actual confusion is not entirely
reliable, as sometimes outside factors, other than a potential trademark
infringement, cause a consumer’s confusion over the manufacturer of a
product.32
Moreover, should the court take into consideration the
sophistication of the confused party33 when weighing the evidence or is it
sufficient that a single group may be confused, while another is not?34
Additionally, exact similarity between marks is not required to show
likelihood to confuse consumers.35 The Ninth Circuit has held it is sufficient
that enough be taken from the trademark to “deceive the public in the
purchase of a protected article.”36 This is not just limited to symbols or
markings placed on products that closely resemble trademarked symbols,37 but
also if products are phonetically substantially similar. The Seventh Circuit held
that “[s]light differences in the sound of similar trademarks will not protect the
infringer.”38 Some examples of trademark infringements held likely to cause
confusion based on phonetics include: Cup-O’-Cola infringing on CocaCola,39 Air-O infringing on Arrow,40 and Gliss’n infringing on Glisten.41
See id. § 23:02.
Id. § 23.02[1].
28 Id. § 23.03[2].
29 Id. § 23.11.
30 Id. § 23.02[2][a].
31 See generally id.
32 See id.
33 See id. § 23:27[1].
34 Id. § 23.28[3].
35 Id. § 24.10 (citing Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963)).
36 Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 161 (9th Cir. 1963)).
37 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:05.
38 Id. (citing G.D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 819 (1959)).
39 Id. § 23.6 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Clay, 324 F.2d 198 (C.C.P.A. 1963)).
26
27
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Phonetic trademark infringements are just one example of the variety of
infringements that exist, all falling under the standard of likelihood to cause
confusion, illustrating how complicated the standard can be. There is no
single test that can be applied to all trademark disputes determining when
likelihood of confusion exists.42 While most courts today still rely heavily on
testimony of consumers who were actually confused,43 with the advent of new
technology, certain courts have adopted simpler methods.44 Some courts go
as far as to use the “Google shortcut,” where they enter the name of the
potentially infringed trademark into an internet search engine and see if the
results would confuse consumers as to which products are which.45
Likelihood to cause confusion is complex. The standard often relies on
what some experts refer to as the court’s “gut reaction” or intuition of if it
feels rights.46 This reliance leads to inconsistency and difficulty when deciding
if a potential infringement possesses the likelihood to cause confusion
element, as it is intuitively left to some level of interpretation. Despite these
problems, likelihood to cause confusion remains the federal standard in
trademark disputes.47
D. THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE POLAROID TEST

Because likelihood to cause confusion is not defined within the Lanham
Act and is thus subject to interpretation, different courts have adopted various
tests to evaluate the standard. The Second Circuit created the most commonly
followed test in 1961.48 In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., the Second
Circuit identified eight factors to weigh when determining likelihood to cause
consumer confusion.49 The Polaroid factors are:
1) strength of the trademark; 2) similarity of the marks; 3)
proximity of the products and their competitiveness with one
another; 4) evidence that the senior user may “bridge the gap”
by developing a product for sale in the market of the alleged

Id. (citing Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. Wright, 46 F.2d 711 (C.C.P.A. 1931)).
Id. (citing In re Strathmore Prods., Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. 766 (T.T.A.B.) 971).
42 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 23.03[1].
43 Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 994 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
44 Lisa L. Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CAL. L. REV. 351 (2014).
45 See generally id.
46 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:26 (1st ed.
1973).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)–(b) (2012).
48 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
49 Id. at 495.
40
41
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infringer’s product; 5) evidence of actual consumer confusion;
6) evidence that the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith; 7)
respective quality of the products; and 8) the sophistication of
consumers in the relevant market.50
The Second Circuit’s test has become somewhat of the standard when
evaluating trademark disputes. The First Circuit51 and the Fourth Circuit,52
and district courts in the Third Circuit,53 Eighth Circuit,54 Ninth Circuit,55 and
Tenth Circuit56 have all adopted the Polaroid test.
E. PRIOR APPLICATION OF TRADEMARK “USE”

Previously, courts did not consider how a defendant used a trademarked
symbol when determining likelihood to cause consumer confusion. It has
simply been enough for the trademark symbol to have been used in any
manner without authorization by the proprietor to bring a claim.
Traditionally, courts only evaluated the manner in which the alleged offenders
used a trademarked symbol if the dispute fell into one of two categories:
establishing the existence of a trademark if a mark is challenged and
affirmative defenses to alleged infringements under the “fair use” exception.57
To register a federal trademark, the proprietor of the mark must show that
it uses the trademark “in the ordinary course of trade.”58 Furthermore, to
maintain the trademark, the proprietor must use the trademark in a manner
that is “public, continuous, and more than de minimis.”59 Strict rules govern
proper use of a trademark by its proprietor.60 If a trademark is not used
according to those rules, the proprietor can lose the exclusive right to use the
mark.61

50 Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Starbucks Corp. v.
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2009)).
51 DeCosta v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 981 F.2d 602, 606 (1st Cir. 1992).
52 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (E.D.
Va. 2006).
53 Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. 3:2006-76, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46955, at *61 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 2010).
54 J.C. Penney Co. v. Arctic Enters., 375 F. Supp. 913 (D. Minn. 1974).
55 Conversive, Inc. v. Conversagent, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1990–93 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
56 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys’s, 724 F. Supp. 808, 815 (D. Kan. 1989).
57 See generally SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (4th ed.
2006).
58 Id. § 5:1.10.
59 Id.
60 See generally KANE, supra note 57, § 5.
61 Id. § 5:2.2.
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Traditionally, courts also look at how alleged offenders used a mark if the
defendant raises a fair use affirmative defense.62 The doctrine of fair use
provides alleged offenders a defense where the defendant’s use is only
describing the defendant’s goods.63 The Lanham Act specifically spells out a
fair use defense where:
[U]se of the name, term, or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or
device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith
only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their
geographic origin.64
The key component of the fair-use doctrine is “use otherwise than as a
trademark,” as long as the mark is not used to attract the attention of the
public.65 The fair-use defense can also be applied to descriptive uses of marks,
as long as it is an accurate description of the product.66 For example, a
description of toothpaste as “the dentists’ choice” was found not to infringe
upon the trademark of “Dentists Choice” toothbrushes, because the
toothpaste in question was the choice of certain dentists.67 However, the fairuse doctrine is not treated as an absolute defense68 and, like all affirmative
defenses, needs to be asserted by the defendant before the court can evaluate
its merits, in these cases, the use of the mark.69
Fair use doctrine frequently clashes with the likelihood to cause confusion
standard.70 The Supreme Court addressed some of those issues in its holding
in KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.71 In this holding, the
Court stated that a defendant asserting fair use has no burden to negate any
likelihood of confusion and that fair use defense applies in cases even when
there is some degree of actual consumer confusion.72 However, the Court did
not address how likelihood of confusion could be relevant when determining a

Id. § 12:2.4.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)).
64 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4) (2012).
65 KANE, supra note 57, § 12:2.4.
66 Id.
67 Wonder Labs, Inc., v. Procter & Gamble Co., 728 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
68 See KANE, supra note 57, § 12:24[C].
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See id. (citing KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111
(2004)).
72 Id.
62
63
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defendant’s fair use or how much confusion is necessary to reject a fair use
defense, if any.73
F. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S “USE” GATEWAY

Recently, the Sixth Circuit has challenged the traditional way of evaluating
likelihood to cause confusion.74 In Hensley Manufacturing, Inc. v. ProPride Inc., the
Sixth Circuit held that before evaluating whether a trademark use infringes
upon the proprietor’s rights, the court first must determine whether the
alleged offender used the trademarked symbol as a mark.75 A court could, for
example, hold a magazine did not infringe on a trademark if it used a
trademarked symbol in a cover story, but not as a trademark.76 Thus, this new
gateway test allows the court to decide on cases without having to enter into
the complicated, multi-factor likelihood to cause confusion analysis.77
Additionally, it provides parties with notice that they can use certain
trademarked marks and symbols without fear of infringing the proprietor’s
exclusivity rights, as long as they do not use the symbol as a mark.78
The Sixth Circuit stated that “[t]he touchstone of liability [for trademark
infringement] is whether the defendant’s use of the disputed mark is likely to
cause confusion among consumers regarding the origins of the goods.”79 The
court held that the first step in trademark infringement analysis should be
determining if the defendant used the mark in a manner to identify the source
of its goods.80 If the mark is not being used to identify the good’s source, then
the mark is being used in a non-trademarked manner and thus the use cannot
be trademark infringement.81
It is important to note, the Sixth Circuit still acknowledges the eight-factor
test set forth by the Second Circuit as the valid way of analyzing likelihood to
cause consumer confusion.82 However, what the Sixth Circuit determined in
Hensley Manufacturing is that before entering that analysis the court must first
answer the preliminary question: is the alleged infringer “using the challenged
mark in a way that identifies the source of their goods”?83 The Sixth Circuit
Id.
Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009).
75 Id. at 610.
76 DRATLER, supra note 24, § 10.01.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Hensley Mfg., 579 F.3d at 610 (alteration in original) (quoting Daddy’s Junky Music Stores,
Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997)).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. (citing Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Sols., Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th
Cir. 2003)).
73
74
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held that if the answer to that question is “no,” then the defendant can not be
infringing on a trademark.84 Therefore, analyzing the eight-factor test is
unnecessary.85 What the Sixth Circuit has essentially established is a gateway
test to trademark disputes based on how the allegedly infringed upon
trademark was used.
The Sixth Circuit argued that the Second Circuit had essentially applied the
same logic in a similar case.86 The Second Circuit stated in Madrigal Audio
Laboratories, Inc. v. Cello, Ltd., that
“[w]hen an individual sells no more than the right to use his
name as a trade name or trademark,” he is not precluded, “from
taking advantage of his individual reputation . . . by establishing
a company which competes against the purchaser . . .” or “from
advertising . . . that he is affiliated with a new company.”87
The Sixth Circuit read the Madrigal holding to mean that because the use of
the name in that case was not likely to cause consumer confusion regarding
the origin of goods, the Second Circuit found in favor of the plaintiff without
needing to evaluate the eight factors.88 Therefore, the Second Circuit
essentially performed the gateway test without explicitly stating so.89
The Sixth Circuit also distinguished its “use gateway” from the traditional
fair use defense.90 The initial question of use would be addressed while the
court is assessing likelihood to cause confusion, the fundamental element of if
a trademark claim may exist. This evaluation comes before the defendant
would raise any fair use affirmative defense, a different test in the Sixth
Circuit’s eyes.91 Though the court did acknowledge, according to the specific
facts of Hensley Manufacturing, that a fair use defense would apply in that case, it
saw no need to go down that road because of the absence of likelihood to
cause consumer confusion under the “use gateway.”92

Id.
Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Madrigal Audio Labs. v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814, 823
(2d Cir. 1986)).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 611–12.
91 Id. at 612.
92 Id.
84
85
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G. THE SECOND CIRCUIT REJECTS THE “USE” GATEWAY

The Second Circuit has expressly rejected the “use” threshold set forth by
the Sixth Circuit.93 In Kelly-Brown, the defendants raised an argument that they
were not liable because they did not use the allegedly infringed upon
trademark in the requisite manner needed to be held liable under the Sixth
Circuit’s gateway test.94 The Second Circuit stated that “[t]he Sixth Circuit’s
approach does not cohere with our jurisprudence on consumer confusion.”95
The court instead stated it would apply the eight-factor Polaroid balancing test
regardless of how the trademarked symbol in question was used. The reasons
why the Second Circuit rejected the gateway test will be discussed in Section
III. The Second Circuit also did not address the Sixth Circuit’s understanding
of the Madrigal holding in the Kelly-Brown holding.
III. WHY SPLIT? BENEFITS AND PITFALLS OF THE 6TH CIRCUIT’S GATEWAY
TEST
A. ARGUMENT FOR ADOPTION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S GATEWAY

The introduction of the “use gateway” by the Sixth Circuit provides courts
with several advantages not available under the traditional approach. The first
is greater judicial efficiency. By introducing the gateway, courts are now able
to dismiss or rule on a trademark dispute without going through the eightfactor test to determine likelihood to cause confusion.96 Through the litigation
process, going through arguments and analysis of all eight factors is timeconsuming and arduous. This gateway provides courts the opportunity to
avoid that analysis in cases where the defendant clearly did not use the symbol
as a mark. In many instances, that eight-factor analysis would be followed by
the defendant raising a fair use defense, causing the court to evaluate how the
mark was used anyway, taking more of the court’s time.
The second benefit of the Sixth Circuit’s gateway is providing notice to
potential infringers.97 The gateway gives these potential users of the symbol a
bright-line rule on when they can use certain trademarks without fear of an
infringement suit. As long as they are not using the symbol as a mark,
potential users know they are safe. This allows them the benefit of being able
to use the mark without fear of being sued and then having to rely on the fair
use defense.

93
94
95
96
97

Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 305.
Id. at 307.
DRATLER, supra note 24, § 10.01.
Id.
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To put it simply, the Sixth Circuit has simplified complicated, potential
issues in trademark infringement cases. The gateway test establishes a brightline rule of when a trademark can be used by someone other than the owner
without fear of infringing upon that trademark. Judges, litigants, and counsel
all benefit from the existence of the bright-line gateway by having a clear
picture of what the rule is, without having to go into the eight-factor test and
then raising a potential fair-use defense. Now if it is clear the alleged infringed
upon symbol is not being used as a mark that is likely to cause consumer
confusion, courts can make speedier decisions allowing for more efficient use
of the court’s time.
B. ARGUMENT AGAINST THE USE OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S GATEWAY

While the Sixth Circuit’s gateway test certainly provides the courts with
some benefits to resolving trademark disputes, it also has downfalls. The
Second Circuit pointed out several of these flaws in the Kelly-Brown holding. In
that holding, the Second Circuit stated “[t]he Sixth Circuit has made a
judgment that no consumer will be confused unless the defendant is using the
infringing content as a mark.”98 What the Second Circuit is addressing is the
potential instance in which the trademarked symbol in question may not be
used as a mark per se, but the presence of the mark may still cause consumers
to be confused as to the origin of the product. The Second Circuit points to
two specific instances where it ruled a symbol was not used as a mark but the
court still held that the trademark’s use caused consumer confusion: EMI
Catalogue Partnership v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopolus Inc. and Louis Vuitton
Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.99 The Second Circuit stated
that under the Sixth Circuit’s new approach, both of these cases would have
been dismissed without addressing a central question in evaluating likelihood
to cause consumer confusion: whether customers were actually confused.100
In rejecting the gateway test in its Kelly-Brown holding, the Second Circuit
also pointed to the particular and individual nature of the facts of each
trademark infringement case.101 This fact-specific nature of trademark cases
makes it necessary, in the Second Circuit’s opinion, to apply all eight of the
Polaroid factors on a case-by-case basis to reach an appropriate decision on

See Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 307.
Id. (citing EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56,
64, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2000)); Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.,
426 F.3d 532, 539 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating in both cases the court found actual confusion existed
amongst consumers despite the trademarked symbol in question not being used as a mark)).
100 Id.
101 Id.
98
99
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likelihood to cause confusion.102 Doing otherwise could lead to an incomplete
or incorrect decision on whether an infringement occurred.
The Second Circuit further asserted in its Kelly-Brown holding that the Sixth
Circuit wrongfully elevated one consideration, use, above all eight of the
Polaroid factors in a manner “inconsistent with this Circuit’s approach to
Lanham Act cases,”103 as demonstrated by the previously discussed rulings of
the court of allowing certain cases to move forward even if the trademarked
symbol in question was not being used as a mark, depending on other facts or
factors. The Second Circuit was particularly peeved that the consideration
raised by the Sixth Circuit - how the mark is being used - was not even one of
the well-established factors that courts had been relying upon for decades.104
Each of the grievances raised by the Second Circuit against the Sixth Circuit’s
gateway test presents valid reasoning for why the new gateway should not
usurp the traditional way of evaluating likelihood to cause confusion.
IV. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? WHAT IS CONVENIENT MAY NOT ALWAYS
BE WHAT IS BEST
Convenience and efficiency, while beneficial, are not always the most
sought-after qualities in litigation. Although the Sixth Circuit’s intentions in
applying its gateway test were good, seeking to prevent what would ultimately
be, in its opinion, frivolous litigation. In trying to accomplish this goal it
proposed a test that proved ultimately, as the Second Circuit correctly pointed
out, to be far too over-inclusive.105 Allowing cases of potential actual
consumer confusion to be dismissed prematurely, before likelihood to cause
confusion can be determined, is irresponsible. That is the reason why going
forward Courts should refrain from adopting the “gateway test.”
As previously stated, the purpose of a trademark is to identify and
distinguish goods to the purchaser as provided by a specific seller.106 Thus, it
can be inferred, that if the placement of a trademarked logo on a product,
regardless of its technical use, causes actual confusion for a prospective
purchaser as to the origin of the product, a trademark infringement might be
possible. The Second Circuit showed that the Sixth Circuit’s use gateway
would allow for certain circumstances of trademark use that cause actual
confusion to be dismissed, leading to over-inclusivity.107

102
103
104
105
106
107
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See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1.
See Kelly-Brown, 717 F.3d at 307.
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Because of the over-inclusive nature of the gateway test, the Sixth Circuit’s
position should not be applied. Judicial efficiency, simplicity, and fair notice
are all valid concerns when trying to determine a bright-line rule for when to
proceed with litigation. However, these factors should not outweigh the
underlying purpose of the law the litigation is seeking to protect. The Sixth
Circuit, in searching for a way to make trademark litigation more efficient,
prioritized likelihood to cause confusion over whether or not actual confusion
may exist, undermining the primary purposes of a trademark. For this reason,
though tedious, courts should follow the Second Circuit and continue to use
the eight-factor Polaroid test, without first applying the Sixth Circuit’s gateway.
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